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Governance of Non-Profit
Organizations: An Appropriate
Standard of Conduct for Trustees




A substantial body of literature has developed concerning the
legal responsibilities of the governing bodies of non-profit organiza-
tions.' Despite considerable recent interest in defining appropriate
standards of conduct for trustees and directors,2 a consensus remains
to be achieved. Consequently, many trustees and directors remain in
doubt regarding what standards apply to their conduct and who is to
be the ultimate arbiter of that conduct?
This article will examine the standards that courts have applied
* B.A., 1958, Yale University; LL.B., 1963, Yale University; Schoeman, Marsh, Updike
& Welt, N.Y., N.Y.; Chairman, Committee on Art Law of the Association of the Bar Of the
City of New York, 1977-79.
1. See, e.g., OLECK, NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND AssOcLA-
TIONS, (3d ed 1974); HOROWITZ, RESPONSIBILITIES AND LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS AND OF-
FICERS OF NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS (1976) [hereinafter cited as "Horowitz"]; DuBoff,
DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF TRUSTEES, in NON-PROFIT CULTURAL ORGANIZATIONS (Practic-
ing Law Institute Course Materials) (1979) [hereinafter cited as "DuBoif']; Eyster, Responsibil-
ities of Directors and Trustees of Not For Profit Organizations, 4 ART AND THE LAW 13 (1978);
Ward, The Fiduciary Duty of Trustees and Officers of a Legal Charity, unpublished manu-
script-Washington, D.C., 1981.
2. As used in this article, the terms trustee or director denote the person with ultimate
legal responsibility for managing the institution. In the case of a corporation the customary
term is "director" and should not be confused with "the Director," the term frequently used to
describe the principal operating officer of a museum. The term "trustee" customarily refers to
the person vested with legal title to property under a common law trust. Frequently the terms
are employed interchangeably in discussing non-profit organizations.
3. See RESEARCH AND FORECASTS, INC., SURVEY OF BUSINESS EXECUTIVES OF NON-
PROFIT BOARDS, (1974) [hereinafter cited as "Touche-Ross Survey"]; Study Details Problen
Facing Directors of Non-Profit Concerns, N.Y.L.J., July 25, 1979, at 1, coL. 3.
The subjective and ethical nature of the issues involved, as well as the lack of agreement
about the appropriate standards has created anxiety in the minds of trustees and directors. See
note 22 infra. The existence of this anxiety suggests the desirability of examining the directions
that courts are taking in cases dealing with the standards applicable to trustees and directors of
non-profit organizations.
to directors and trustees of non-profit cultural institutions, 4 most no-
tably the non-profit museum. Simply stated, the question is whether
persons governing these institutions should be held to a strict com-
mon law trust standard,5 or whether they should be judged accord-
ing to the more flexible "prudent man rule" traditionally applied to
directors of corporations.6 This article suggests that the latter stan-
dard is preferable because the issues facing such persons more nearly
resemble the issues facing the directors of business corporations, and
in particular, with respect to museums because of the subjective and
sensitive nature of the policy questions that surround the manage-
ment of museum collections. The prudent man standard recognizes
the complexities of modem management duties, and at the same
time, provides appropriate safeguards for the public, for whose bene-
fit these vital institutions have been created.7 Further, it is submitted
that ritualistic adherence to the common law trust standard is unnec-
essarily restrictive; besides, on important issues, such as self-dealing,8
4. A non-profit cultural institution is a charity. People ex rel. Scott v. George F. Har-
ding Museum, 58 Ill. App. 3d 408, 374 N.E.2d 756 (App. Ct. 1978). A charity can be organized
as a charitable or public trust or as a charitable corporation. The former is governed by the
common law, whereas the charitable corporation is a creature of statute subject to the applica-
ble corporation law of the particular state. Practically speaking, the charitable trust and chari-
table corporation serve the same purpose but the standards of conduct required of fiduciaries
have been said to differ markedly. DuBoff, supra note I at 61.
5. See note 12 and accompanying text infra.
6. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 7734 (Purdon 1981-82); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT
CoRP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1980-81. ("Directors and officers shall discharge the duties of
their respective positions in good faith and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which
ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions.")
7. This conclusion has been reached notwithstanding that in the past the corporate stan-
dard has been pejoratively equated with "the morals of the marketplace" by one so eminent as
Benjamin Cardozo. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928). Furthermore, and more
recently the Attorney General of the State of New York has acknowledged but lamented the
trend away from imposing a strict trust standard on the conduct of governing bodies of non-
profit institutions. Abrams, Regulating Charity-The State's Role, in THE RECORD OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 481, 485 (1980).
It can, however, be argued persuasively that this trend, although deplored by the Attorney
General of New York, is a healthy development, which will result in better management, un-
dertaken by the most qualified persons.
8. In the trust situation, self-dealing arises when the trustee is on both sides of a
transaction; that is, personally dealing with the trust in which he is the trustee ...
While he is administering the trust he must refrain from placing himself in a position
where his personal interests or that of a third person does or may conflict with the
interest of the beneficiaries.
DuBoff, supra note I at 77-78. A corporate director breaches the duty of loyalty to the legal
entity when he takes advantage of his position and seeks personal gain. A trustee or director of
a non-profit cultural institution has a duty not to usurp a corporate opportunity and must
refrain from competition with the museum. This conflict may, for example, arise when a
trustee who personally collects art objects learns of an opportunity to purchase a rare work by
virtue of his position as a trustee. Because each situation is unique, requiring a subjective
judgment by the individual fiduciary, it is a sound policy to avoid such conflicts whenever
possible. When avoidance is impossible, complete disclosure by the trustee of his personal
interest is prudent. Recent ethics guidelines published by museums provide for disclosure by
all members of the governing board. "Every museum trustee should file with the board a
statement disclosing his personal, business and organizational interests and affiliations and
those of persons close to him which could be construed as museum related." Museum Ethics.-
the distinctions between trust and corporate standards are largely a
matter of semantics.
II. The Historical Setting and the Modem Context
Contemporary private trust law is rooted in the ancient English
concept of "use"9 whereby the legal title to real property was placed
in the hands of a nominal owner who would hold it for the use of a
real party in interest. The result was the avoidance of the restrictions
and complexities historically associated with the legal ownership and
transfer of realty in feudal England.' 0 The English Courts of Chan-
cery were charged with the duty of compelling trustees to carry out
the grantor's wishes and generally requiring trustees to act solely for
the benefit of the beneficiaries. Accordingly, trustees were precluded
from delegating their authority over trust property, and they were
further precluded from extracting any form of gain for themselves by
means of their nominal ownership of the property. Transgression of
these restrictions could result in the possibility of a surcharge, and
the duty to account."
In more modem times, the standard of conduct required of a
trustee has been summarized in the oft-quoted words of Benjamin
Cardozo, in the case of Meinhard v. Salmon, as follows:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but thepunctillio of
an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to
this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveter-
ate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of
equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty
by the "disintegrating erosion" of particular exceptions. [citations
omitted] only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been
kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.'
2
In contrast to the common law trust, the development of the
modem corporation was essentially a nineteenth century phenome-
Report to the American Association of Museums by its Committee on Ethics, - MUSEUM NEWS
21, 29-30 (1978).
9. For detailed discussion of the origin of the trust or use doctrine, see BOGERT, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES §§ 1-8 (2d ed. 1965).
10. Id §§ 2, 3 and 4. These included, inter alia, restrictions on devise, incidents of own-
ership, creditors' rights, and ownership by aliens.
11. See generally Albert, The Legal Liabilities ofTrustees, Directors and Officers of a Non-
Profit Cultural Institution, in NON-PROFIT CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS 103 (1979).-
12. 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (emphasis added). It is interesting to note that although Meinhard
is widely cited in common law trust cases it did not itself involve a common law trust. The
case was brought by a co-adventurer in a real estate deal against his partner because the part-
ner purportedly appropriated to himself a business opportunity, a real estate development on
the corner of Fifth Avenue and 42nd Street in New York City, which the Court found to have
belonged to the joint venture. The case has been cited with approval in Pennsylvania. See,
e.g., Comerford's Estate, 388 Pa. 278, 130 A.2d 458 (1957).
non.' 3 The fundamental rule governing the conduct of directors of
business corporations is the "prudent man rule."' 4 Likewise, the
charitable corporation is a relatively recent legal innovation, which
has characteristics of both a corporation and a trust. 5 If the "pru-
dent man rule" rather than the stricter trust standard is applied to a
non-profit museum, members of the governing body will avoid per-
sonal liability for "bad judgment not so reckless or extravagant as to
amount to bad faith or gross or wilful negligence."' 6
Of recent vintage also is a heightened public awareness of the
activities of museum trustees and directors. A booming art market' 7
and a greater public interest in cultural pursuits generally, increased
government funding and the concomitant increase in government
regulation have all fostered public concern about the proper govern-
ance of America's cultural institutions. Media attention has further
contributed to the closer scrutiny of museum boards in the exercise
of their legal powers and fiduciary duties.' 8
Museum governing bodies, like common law trustees, are
charged with the duty to manage the assets of the organization,
which includes ultimate responsibility for the management of the in-
vestment portfolio of the museum. Again like the traditional trustee,
they must comply with the museum's charter and other donative in-
struments. In addition however, they have a duty to supervise mu-
seum programs and personnel, and a duty to protect and preserve
the collection. The latter includes maintenance of proper storage
and conservation facilities, stable environmental controls, adequate
record-keeping and research, as well as oversight of the acquisition
13. For a detailed discussion of the origins of the modem corporation, see BAKER &
CAREY, CORPORATIONS (3 ed 1959); Gomer, Some Contrasts Between Britih and American
Corporation Law, 69 HARe. L. REV. 1369 (1956); Raymond, The Genesis ofthe Corporation, 16
HARV. L. REV. 79 (1920).
14. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRnP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1980-81); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1408 (Purdon 1981-82). Whereas a trustee of a common law trust may be liable for simple
negligence, a corporate director must have erred by a greater degree than a simple error of
judgment. See I HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 446 (1959); BALLANTINE,
CORPORATIONS § 63(a) (rev'd ed. 1946); Mann v. Commonwealth Bond Corp., 27 F. Supp.
315, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1938). This standard has generally been carried over with minor variations
in the statutes governing non-profit corporations. Compare N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (Mc-
Kinney 1980) and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408 (Purdon 1981-82) with N.Y. NoT-FOR-
PROFIT CORP. LAW §717 (McKinney 1980) and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 7734 (Purdon 1981-
82).
15. See note 4 supra.
16. Beard v. Achenbach Mem. Hospital Assn., 170 F.2d 857, 862 (10th Cir. 1948) (apply-
ing Kansas law). See note 41 infra.
17. Part of the reason for the increased attention to museum collections and the trustees
who hold ultimate responsibility for them is the rise in the value of art objects and the poten-
tial profit from art investment by private collectors, including museum trustees. The potential
conflict has evoked concern among many responsible museum trustees, and was the subject of
a seminar in October 1980 held by the Trustees Committee of the American Association of
Museums in Philadelphia.
18. See notes 52, 64-7 and accompanying text infra.
and deaccessioning policies.' 9 They must also maintain the physical
plant, providing sufficient insurance against fire and theft. Finally,
museum boards are required to assure access to the collection by
scholars and by members of the public at large.
20
With increased public scrutiny in a generally litigious era came
the likelihood of legal liability for failure to properly discharge these
duties. Yet, whether in the context of a common law trust or a non-
profit corporation, evidence indicates2' that members of the gov-
erning bodies of non-profit institutions lack clear guidelines for the
day-to-day conduct of their respective offices. This uncertainty has
led to an increasing concern 22 on the part of persons who are serving
on governing bodies of non-profit institutions that the risks of per-
sonal liability are too great. In a recent survey of trustees and direc-
tors conducted by Touche-Ross, more than two-thirds of the
respondents believed that the pressure of law suits against board
members was oin the rise. The question arises, then, whether many
19. The term "deaccession" is a word peculiar to the museum profession. It connotes the
removal of a work of art from the official collection of the institution, but does not imply the
manner of disposition (e.g. sale, gift, destruction, continued use for study purposes). An object
might be deacessioned because the museum does not possess the facilities to properly care for
it, because the collection contains duplicates, or other, better examples of a particular artist's
work, or because it is no longer germane to the main focus of the collection. Many institutions
now have published deaccessioning guidelines to assist in the decision-making process. See
examples of such policies reprinted in Museum Objects of Concern IV- Materials, LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION 115 (1980) (American Law Institute-American Bar
Association Continuing Legal Education Materials).
20. See generaly DuBoff, supra note 1. See Richoux, Serota-Braden, and Dymttenaere,
A Policy For Collections Access, Museum News, July-August 1981, at 43-47.
21. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses and Missionaries,
381 F. Supp. 1003, 1018 (D.C. 1974) [hereinafter cited as "Sterm"]. The court refused to
surcharge directors of a hospital corporation although the court found a breach of fiduciary
duty, in part because the case was one of first impression in the District of Columbia. See also
Museum Ethics. A Report to the American Association of Museums by its Committee on Ethics,
MUSEUM NEws, March/April 1978, at 21. The Report is a careful attempt to translate ethical
principles into a practical code of conduct. The Code is relatively concrete with respect to
employees but becomes much more general when dealing with the conduct of members of the
museum governing bodies. For example, consider the following statements from the Report:
[Trustees must be] unequivocally loyal to the purpose of the Museum... . A policy
must be developed and adopted by the board governing use of the collection ...
The reputation of the Museum can be damaged should a trustee continue an inap-
propriate activity concurrent with his service in a position of institutional and public
trust.
Id at 29-30.
22. See generally Touche-Ross Survey, supra note 3. This important study was under-
taken in order to survey the attitudes of business executives serving on the boards of educa-
tional, cultural and social services organizations. The study consisted of in-depth interviews
with sixty such persons followed by a questionnaire mailed to 837 executives, of which 30%
responded. The respondents' attitude toward legal accountability is highly significant. More
than two-thirds believed that pressure of lawsuits had increased in the past ten years and even
more expect further increases. One trustee of a major university confided that "I expect suits
or claims against board members to inhibit members from serving." Id at 6. On the other
hand a more sanguine view was expressed by a museum director who said "Probably as soon
as laws allowing boards to be sued get out of hand, somebody will write another law that will
make it impossible to sue a board member." Id Despite this long range optimism, the mu-
seum director admitted having recently resigned from several boards because of undue expo-
sure to liability.
valuable trustees and directors23 will be discouraged from serving
because of the fear of growing exposure to liability. Such a result
would be a public disaster, especially in light of the clear signals
from the national administration that direct government support of
cultural institutions has reached its limit, and is likely to decline.
24
The private sector must be encouraged to participate at every level,
and the recruitment of quality leadership at this critical time is vital
to the future of these organizations.
III. Exploring the Problem
A. The Common Law Trustee vs. The Corporate Director.-
Applicable Standards of Conduct
Since little case law exists dealing with the standards of conduct
required of directors of non-profit institutions, it is helpful to com-
pare the standards applicable to private trustees on the one hand,
and to directors of business corporations on the other.
The common law trustee is generally charged only with the
management of trust funds and is therefore reasonably expected to
devote more time and expertise to the task. 5 Although a high de-
gree of skill is required, a trustee's liability has reasonable limita-
tions:
A trustee is liable for losses resulting from his failure to use the
requisite care, skill or caution; but he is not a guarantor or an
insurer nor liable for surcharge for shrinkage of value due to eco-
nomic conditions over which he had no control.
26
In addition to the strict standards of diligence and skill required
of a trustee when dealing with trust assets, a common law trustee has
23. As a rule, those who serve as trustees on the governing boards of the nation's art
institutions are a rather homogeneous group. Of the perhaps twenty thousand persons who
serve as trustees across the country, the majority are over sixty years of age and are likely to be
graduates of Ivy League colleges; they often sit on more than one board and by profession they
are either bankers, entrepreneurs, architects, writers, professors or political personalities. Fi-
nally, trustees generally share more than prominent family lineage and wealth and are fre-
quently private collectors with expertise to offer a museum. See Glueck, Power and Esthetics.-
The Trustee, 59 ART IN AMERICA 78 (1971) reprinted in J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, LAW,
ETHICS AND THE VisuAL ARTS 7-60 (1979).
Although members of museum governing boards remain for the most part, a homogene-
ous group, .inroads have been made by women and minorities. A recent survey in a leading
arts periodical revealed that many museums have at least one woman on the board and in
urban communities, goyerning boards are comprised of equal numbers of men and women.
Even with the influs of women, most board members, men and women alike, remain wealthy
patrons of the arts from the upper echelon of the social strata while a minority are profession-
als from education, politics or business. See Trucco, The Growing Number of Women Trustees,
76 ARTNEWS 54 (1977).
24. The Reagan Administration has proposed cutting by half the budgets of the National
Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities. Fiscal Year 1982
Budget Revisions, March 1981 at 63.
25. Stern, 381 F. Supp. at 1013.
26. Breen, Legal Aspects of Substituting Common Stocks for Fixed Income Securities
Under the Prudent Man Rule, N.Y.L.J. June 28, 1968, at 4, col. 1.
a duty of undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries of the trust. In no
sense, therefore, may a trustee exact personal profit in his dealings
with trust assets. Further, the duty of loyalty is breached when the
trustee deals with the trust as a principal, regardless of whether the
transaction was fair or advantageous to the trust.27 For example, in
one case a common law trustee was surcharged for effecting securi-
ties transactions for the trust through a brokerage firm with which
the trustee was affiliated.28
A considerably less stringent standard has been adopted with
respect to the activities of corporate directors: "Mere negligence...
which would subject a trustee to liability is not adjudged as serious a
deficiency in a director. ' 29 One law professor has pressed the dis-
tinction thus:
I remain very skeptical of the proposition that directors of indus-
trial corporations run any substantial risk of liability for ordinary
negligence. There is, in fact, little precedent for liability even for
the kind of Merovingian supineness for which directors were held
liable in the old bank cases.
30
Moreover, in contrast to a trustee's duty of undivided loyalty, corpo-
rate directors are not absolutely precluded from self dealing. A
board of directors may authorize corporate transactions in which in-
dividual directors have a pecuniary interest, provided that the inter-
ested directors make full disclosure and refrain from participating in
the board's decision.3'
B. Directors of Non-Profit Corporations. Which Standard?
A considerable difference of opinion has developed regarding
the standard of conduct applicable to directors of non-profit corpora-
tions. At one extreme, it has been urged that directors of non-profit
corporations be held to a standard even less stringent than that im-
posed on directors of a business corporation because such persons
are civic-minded and serve without compensation. 32 At the other ex-
treme, a few commentators have urged imposing the same strict stan-
dards that are applicable to common law trustees. 3
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170, comments f& h; Lerch Estate, 399 Pa. 59,
159 A.2d 506 (1960).
28. Curtis Trust, 19 Pa. Fiduc. I (Phila. Orphans Ct. 1968).
29. 1 HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 446, 183 (1959).
30. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks. New Trends in the Indemnification of Corpo-
rate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1101 (1968).
31. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1980).
32. See, e.g., Taylor, A New Chapter in the New York Law o/Charitable Corporations, 25
CORNELL L.Q. 382, 398 (1940).
33. Lesher, The Non-Profit Corporation - A Neglected Step-child Comes fAge, 22 Bus.
LAW. 951,969 (1967); Comment, 26 So. CALIF. L. REv. 80, 85 (1952). See WHITE, NEW YORK
CORPORATIONS, NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATE LAW § 717.01 (1980).
Representative of this latter view is the opinion of the current Attorney General of New
York who recently has written:
This divergence of opinion is reflected in a number of legislative
enactments. Some jurisdictions have statutorily adopted the "pru-
dent man rule." For example, in New York, directors of non-profit
corporations
shall discharge the duties of their respective positions in good faith
and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily
prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like
positions.34
In addition, the New York statute provides that, with respect to the
administration of a restricted endowment, a director of a charitable
corporation "shall not be deemed a trustee of an express trust of such
assets."
35
By contrast, a Pennsylvania statute provides that:
Every nonprofit corporation incorporated for a charitable purpose
or purposes may take, receive and hold such real and personal
property as may be given, devised to, or otherwise vested in such
corporation, in trust, for the purpose or purposes set forth in its
articles. The board of directors or other body of the corporation
shall, as trustees of such property, be held to the same degree of
responsibility and accountability as if not incorporated, unless a
less degree or a particular degree of responsibility and accounta-
bility is prescribed in the trust instrument, or unless the board of
directors or such other body remain under the control of the mem-
bers of the corporation or third persons who retain the right to
direct, and do direct, the actions of the board or other body as to
the use of the trust property from time to time.36
Although no reported decisions have construed the scope of this stat-
ute, on its face the provision adopts at the very least a common law
trust standard for the management of the endowment of non-profit
corporations in Pennsylvania. Accordingly, in Pennsylvania any di-
rector of a charitable corporation who is a stock broker is subjecting
himself to a substantial risk of surcharge if his firm handles the or-
ganization's investments. On the other hand, in New York, and
other jurisdictions adopting the corporate "prudent man rule," the
director of a charitable corporation would merely have a duty to dis-
While there has been a trend toward adoption of a single standard, as reflected in the
case law and some recent statutory enactments, unfortunately, the standard selected
has usually been the less strict standard of conduct expected of business directors.
Abrams, Regulating Charity - The State's Role, THE RECORD OF THE AsSOCIATION OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 481, 485 (1980). Indeed, as the Attorney General admits,
such courts as have discussed the question seem to favor the "prudent man rule" as developed
under the business corporation standard. Id See, e.g., Stern, 381 F. Supp. at 1013-1014;
Creighton Home v. Waltman, 140 Neb. 3, 14, 299 N.W. 261, 264 (1941); Attorney General v.
Olson, 346 Mass. 190, 198, 191 N.E.2d 132, 137 (1963); Pepperdine Foundation v. Pepperdine,
126 Cal. App. 2d 154, 159, 271 P.2d 600, 604 (1954). See also Christiansen v. Nat'l Savings &
Trust Co., No. 70-1833 (D. D.C., filed Oct. 16, 1980) (described Stern holding as "the outer
limits of the imposition of liability on directors of non-profit corporations on trust theory
grounds").
34. N.Y. NoT-FOR-PROFIT CoRP. LAW § 717(a) (McKinney 1980).
35. Id § 513(a).
36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 7549(a) (Purdon 1981-82).
close his interest and refrain from participating in the governing
body's decision with respect to employing the investment firm .
3 7
C. The Growing Acceptance of the Corporate Standard in the
Management of Non-Profit Organizations
Absent a controlling statute, the trend of recent case law has
been to judge directors of charitable corporations according to the
less strict standard of conduct expected of business directors.38 In
the leading case of Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training
School for Deaconesses and Missionaries,39 patients of a non-profit
hospital in the District of Columbia alleged that the directors' had
breached their duties through mismanagement and self-dealing. In
particular, the patients challenged various aspects of the hospital's
fiscal management, including the failure to invest large cash bal-
ances, the hiring of an investment advisory firm dominated by a di-
rector of the hospital, and the failure of the finance committee to call
meetings. Although the court found that these practices constituted
a breach of fiduciary duties, the court elected neither to surcharge
the offending trustees nor remove them from office. In withholding
these sanctions, the court was clearly influenced by the uncertainty
regarding appropriate standards for trustees of a non-profit institu-
tion:
Basically, the trustees are charged with mismanagement, nonman-
agement and self dealing. The applicable law is unsettled. The
charitable corporation is a relatively new legal entity which does
not fit neatly into the established common law categories of corpo-
ration and trust. As the discussion below indicates, however, the
modem trend is to apply corporate rather than trust principles in
determining the liability of the directors of charitable corporations
because their functions are virtually indistinguishable from those
of their pure corporate counterparts.4
37. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715 (McKinney 1980). A similar rule seems to
apply in the District of Columbia. Stem, 381 F. Supp. at 1014, 1016. It was defendant Ferris'
active advice and his vote in the relatively small investment committee to recommend ap-
proval of an investment contract between the hospital and his firm, Ferris & Co., which the
court found to be a breach of duty.
38. For cases applying the prudent man rule see note 33 supra.
39. 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.C. 1974).
40. The hospital's directors included such pillars of the community as senior officers of
four banks and savings and loan associations and the senior partner of a respected securities
brokerage firm. Id
41. Id at 1013. In a similar case against the directors of a hospital, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated the rule as follows:
The directors of a corporation are charged with the duty of managing its affairs hon-
estly and in good faith, and they must exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the
performance of their duties. They must act with fidelity to the interest of the corpora-
tion, and they are jointly and severally liable for losses of the corporation proxi-
mately resulting from bad faith, fraudulent breaches of trust, or gross or wilful
negligence in the discharge of their duties. But under the law of Kansas the directors
of a corporation, acting in good faith and within the limitations of the law, have the
power to determine its policies and manage its affairs. . . . And ill-success or bad
Even in jurisdictions purporting to adopt the corporate "pru-
dent man" standard of conduct for directors of non-profit corpora-
tions, a difficult situation may still arise regarding certain "hybrid"
charitable corporations. For example, a recent New York construc-
tion proceeding involved a charitable bequest in trust under an 1836
will.42 The will had directed the trustees to create a charitable cor-
poration to operate the fund, and this was in fact accomplished. In
construing the will, however, the court seems vague as to whether
trust or corporate standards apply to this hybrid trust corporation.
The fact that the corporation was established pursuant to a will
merely accentuates the problem. After describing generally the pow-
ers of the fiduciary administering the charitable trust in trust terms,
the court proceeds to apply the prudent man rule to the particular
facts of the case in terms that could have applied equally to corpo-
rate directors:
As an overriding concern, the 'Trustees' had the responsibility to
exercise their powers as an ordinary prudent man would in order
to carry out in permanent fashion the charitable purposes of the
trust. .... 43
This confusion of terminology supports the conclusion of some that
in the application to non-profit organizations, the distinction be-
tween the trust and corporate standards is largely one of semantics,
at least when self-dealing is involved."
D. The Importance of Good Faith
Despite evidence of the growing acceptance of the corporate
standard of conduct for the governing bodies of non-profit institu-
tions, the case law continues to yield inconsistent results. In in-
stances of self-dealing, however, a common element, namely the
presence or absence of good faith, appears to be determinative of the
personal liability of directors of non-profit institutions. Whether the
court purports to apply either a trust or corporate standard of con-
duct, this common factor of good faith may account for what other-
wise seem like inconsistent outcomes in the cases.
Blankenship v. Boyle45 was a derivative action brought on behalf
judgment not so reckless or extravagant as to amount to bad faith or gross or wilful
negligence on the part of directors in the discharge of their duties do not warrant the
appointment of a receiver for the corporation or the rendition of a personal judgment
against the directors. Beard v. Achenbach Mem. Hosp. Ass'n, 170 F.2d 857, 862 (10th
Cir. 1948).
It is sometimes argued, however, that a director who has greater skills than the
ordinary prudent man may be held to that higher level that he actually possesses.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959).
42. Matter of Samuel Jones, (Surr. Ct. Queens Co., N.Y.) N.Y.L.J. Feb. 17, 1981 at 17,
col. I.
43. Id
44. Horowitz, supra note 1.
45. Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971).
of coal miners with present or future benefit rights in a union welfare
trust fund. The defendants included the fund and its present (and
some past) trustees. The court held that it was a breach of fiduciary
obligation for the trustees to permit large accumulations of cash to
remain uninvested. Although the court found that the so-called
"neutral" trustee of the fund did not profit personally in any way,
she was nevertheless removed as a trustee, along with the other trust-
ees, including the President of the United Mineworkers, W.A.
(Tony) Boyle. The court referred merely to her "naivete and inat-
tention,"' but the tenor of the court's opinion strongly suggests that
the "neutral" trustee's neutrality was tainted by the company she
kept.
The same judge who removed and surcharged the "neutral"
trustee in Blankenship fashioned a different remedy in the Stern
case.4 7 There the court also found a breach of fiduciary duty on the
part of certain directors, applying the more relaxed corporate stan-
dard held applicable in the District of Columbia. The court, how-
ever, refrained from prescribing the strong medicine meted out in
Blankenshq,, and merely enjoined further conduct of the sort it con-
demned. No one was surcharged; no one was removed. Among the
stated reasons for limiting the relief in the Stern case were that the
criticized practices had been "to a considerable extent"48 corrected,
and that there was no indication of fraud or personal profit on the
part of the distinguished persons who were found to have breached
their fiduciary duties as directors. This lack of personal profit did
not save the neutral trustee in Blankenship. The presence or absence
of good faith provides a more satisfying rationale for distinguishing
Blankenship from Stern, than the fact that one case involved a trust
and the other a corporation.
Similarly, in George Pepperdine Foundation v. Pepperdine et
al. , a philanthropist had given a large sum of money to a charita-
ble corporation. As president of the corporation, acting in good faith
and not for personal gain, he invested the assets unwisely, resulting
in large losses to the corporation. On these facts the California court
held that neither the philanthropist nor his acquiescing board of di-
rectors was liable for the losses. Although the court (in what some
cynics might find a classic understatement) said that the dissipation
of some $3 million was a "regrettable situation," it was not "one that
requires a burnt offering or that demands the swinging of human
46. Id at I111.
47. 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.C, 1974).
48. Id at 1018. The phrase is a curious one and raises the interesting question as to what
extent the condemned conduct was noi corrected.
49. 126 Cal. App. 2d 127, 271 P.2d 600 (1954).
forms from the gibbet to gratify the rancor of intimate observers. '50
The court could find not a "chirp in the voluminous pleading inti-
mating that a corrupt motive marred the character or inspired the
acts of any one of [the directors]. .... I
In Illinois Railway Museum v. Hansen, 52 a preliminary injunc-
tion was issued in favor of a museum on a showing that a former
member of the museum's board of directors had deliberately reneged
on a promise to donate certain railway equipment to the museum.
The equipment had been on loan to the museum from the director
and the museum had expended money and manpower on its rehabil-
itation and upkeep, in reliance on the director's promise, which had
been made while he was a director.
The results in Blankensho, Stern, Pepperdine and Illinois Rail-
way Museum are consistent whether one thinks in terms of a trust or
corporate standard, when viewed from the perspective of the pres-
ence or absence of a corrupt motive. If any suggestion of corruption
is present, the courts will not hesitate to surcharge and remove mem-
bers of governing bodies, whether the corruption fastens upon them
personally or whether they are merely tainted with the corruption of
others. When that aroma is absent such relief is uncommon.
IV. Application of Trust and Corporate Standards to the
Management of Non-Profit Cultural Institutions
When the purposes of the non-profit organization include art or
culture, the issue of fiduciary responsibility becomes emotionally
charged. The art world seems to incite the adrenalin of the public
and particularly the press.53
50. Id at 603.
51. Id.
52. No. 80 CH 229 (19th Judicial District of Illinois, McHenry Co. Oct. 17, 1980) (order
granting preliminary injunction). The plaintiff museum asserted in its papers that
the rule is well established in Illinois that the officers and directors of a business
corporation occupy a fiduciary relation to the corporation [citations omitted]. The
officers and directors of a not-for-profit corporation are charged with the same degree
of fidelity to the interest of the corporation as are the officers and directors of a busi-
ness corporation.
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 8.
53. In a recent New York case dealing with the sale of a work of art (although happily
not involving a non-profit organization), the trial judge characterized the testimony as follows:
We have just completed a journey through the fantasy land of marketing in the fine
arts. Prestigious names have been dropped freely as rain. Large sums of money or
negotiable paper have changed hands suddenly. Valuable objects of art have moved
internationally with comparable swiftness. Our guides have been some seven wit-
nesses of whom only one testified with compelling truth. The relevant core of testi-
mony was that in an industry whose transactions cry out for verification of both title
and authenticity of subject matter, it is deemed poor practice to probe into either.
Porter v. Wertz, (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co.). N.J.L.J. Mar. 14, 1978, at 6, col. i, rev'd on other
grounds, 68 A.D.2d 141, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1979), ajrd, - N.Y. - (1981). This perhaps well-
founded, suspicion about the art business has apparently carried over, at least in the press, to
museums. See, for example, the following random selection of recent newspaper headlines:
"Is The Norton Simon Museum Mismanaged?" 79 ART. NEWS 136 (Oct. 1980); "Judge Clears
In our society, it is the responsibility of courts of law to sit in
judgment of fiduciaries. Critical media comment or even the filing
of a court action by a State Attorney General or other interested
party obviously is not proof that wrong doing on the part of museum
trustees and directors has occurred. In fact, by any fair test it must
be concluded that the decisions reached by courts reveal no signifi-
cant pattern of misconduct on the part of governing bodies of such
institutions: Very few reported cases exist in which directors or
trustees of museums or art organizations have been criticized.54 At
least as many court opinions have dismissed challenges of this sort."5
For example, in the case of Harris v. Attorney General, 56 the trustees
of the express trust creating the Hill-Stead Museum in Farmington,
Connecticut sought court approval for the sale of a portion of the
museum's real estate because the institution was in financial trouble
and because that particular property was not suitable for continued
use as a museum. The court allowed the trustees broad discretion in
determining that such a disposition was in the public interest despite
opposition by the Attorney General and other beneficiaries under
the express trust. In addition, the court found that the trustees had
Sale of Eighteenth Century Table by Historical Society," Baltimore Sun, June 21, 1979;
"Judge Blocks Sale of Harding Curios," Chicago Tribune, Oct. , 197-; "Conflict Charges
Challenge Art Traditions," Detroit Free Press, January 29, 1978; "Board Deals Violate Mu-
seum Ethics," The Cleveland Press, Mar. 5, 1980; "Showdown Looms in Museum-of-Art's
Fight Over By-laws," San Diego Evening Tribune, June 16, 1980; "A Museum Raises Ques-
tions About the Ethics of Its Director," New York Times, Oct. 14, 1980; "Simon Museum Sale
of Art Challenged," New York Times, May 9, 1980. It should be emphasized that the author is
unaware of any judicial finding of misconduct on the part of the trustees or directors of any of
the institutions referred to in the above newspaper stories.
54. See, e.g., Conway v. Emeny, 139 Conn. 612, 96 A.2d 221 (1953); Illinois Railway
Museum v. Hansen, No. 80 CH 229 (19th Judicial Circuit of Illinois, McHenry County Oct. 17,
1980) (order granting preliminary injunction). See also Lefkowitz v. Museum of the American
Indian (Heye Foundation) No. 41461-75 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1975), in which the majority of the
board members resigned voluntarily prior to judgment and the Attorney General of the State
of New York approved the successors.
There are also very few cases involving other kinds of cultural institutions in which trust-
ees or directors have been held to have violated the fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Zehner v.
Alexander et al., No. 56-1979 (Pa. C.P. Franklin Co., Orphan's Ct. Div. 1979) (Decree filed
May 25, 1979) (court removed college president and one board member who had attempted to
close college that was in financial difficulty); Endress v. Brookdale Community College, 144
N.J. Super. Ct. 109, 364 A.2d 1080 (1976) (corporate directors liable in damages for unlawful
infringement of faculty member's constitutional rights); but see Selzer v. Berkowitz, No. 77-
1897 (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 1, 1980) (court refused to set aside jury verdict of $580,000 against six
members of college political science faculty who denied plaintiff promotion and tenure be-
cause of plaintiff's fifteen minute debriefing by the Central Intelligence Agency, but jury re-
fused to find board members liable). Matter of Horticultural Society of New York, (Sup. Ct.,
N.Y. Co. 1980); N.Y.L.J., Apr. 1, 1980, at 5, col. 1. (Board's proposed sale, at fair and reason-
able price, of a rare book collection, upheld.)
55. State of Washington ex rel. Slade Gorton, Attorney General v. Leppaluoto et al., No.
11777 & 11781 (Super. Ct., Klickitat Co., Wash. 1977) (dismissed as to trustees with prejudice,
1978). The court file indicates, however, that the Board agreed to permit the Attorney General
to join in the selection process of the Board's members. Cf. Town of Huntington v. American
Museum of Natural History, (Sup. Ct., Suffolk Co. 1980) N.Y.L.J. July 22, 1980, at § 12, col. 3;
Harris v. Attorney General, 31 Conn. Sup. 93, 324 A.2d 279 (1974).
56. 31 Conn. Sup. 93, 324 A.2d 279 (1974).
acted prudently in providing a security system and in declining to
insure the collection. The court upheld this decision by the trustees
as a reasonable and practical judgment.57
Although there have been few, if any, actual findings of miscon-
duct on the part of museum governing bodies, a number of other
cases have been settled prior to trial or are still pending. A review of
these cases, which, for various reasons, were never decided on their
merits, reveals that the allegedly breached responsibilities are more
typical of the duties of the directors of a modern business corpora-
tion than they are of the duties of a common law trustee.
For example in People ex ret Scott v. George Harding Mu-
seum, 18 the Illinois Attorney General filed a complaint against vari-
ous museum board members, alleging that the museum collection
was not displayed to the public, that the collection was permitted
physically to deteriorate in storage, that the museum was operated
consistently at a deficit while the trustees authorized excessive sala-
ries, 59 that moneys were borrowed from a bank controlled by a mu-
seum director in violation of the self dealing prohibitions of the
private foundation excise tax provisions,6° and that the trustees made
questionable investments in real estate.61
Similarly, in State of Washington ex rel Gordon v. Leppaluoto, et
al, 62 a petition by the Washington State Attorney General charged
that the trustees of the Maryhill Museum violated their fiduciary du-
ties in that they had improperly stored the collection, failed to con-
duct annual audits, released a trustee from a long-term lease
obligation to the museum without adequate consideration, failed to
properly supervise the museum director, failed to fill the vacant di-
rector's position, failed to comply with the museum's by-laws, per-
mitted private borrowing from the collection, failed to prudently
manage certain real estate holdings, failed to prevent the purchase of
art objects which were not authentic, and permitted the physical
plant to fall into disrepair.63
In Lefko witz v. Museum of The American Indian, et al, 64 the
57. Id. at 101-02, 324 A.2d at 284.
58. 58 I11. App. 3d 308, 374 N.E.2d 756 (1978) (complaint, Docket No. 76 CH 6446). See
also Commonwealth v. Barnes Foundation, 398 Pa. 458, 159 A.2d 500 (1960) (duty to be open
to the public).
59. See also Williams v. McClave, 85 Misc. 184, 148 N.Y.S. 93 (1914).
60. I.R.C. § 4941(d).
61. The Harding Museum case was scheduled for trial in May, 1981.
62. Nos. 11777 & 11781 (Super. Ct., Klickitat Co., Wash. held April 4, 1977).
63. Id Petition at 2-6.
64. Lefkowitz v. Museum of the American Indian, (Heye Foundation), No. 41461-75
(Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1975) (Petition for a Compulsory Accounting and Removal of Trustees
June 27, 1975) (Stipulation and Consent filed Jan. 31, 1980).
After investigation New York's Attorney General brought suit against the director and
trustees based on the contention that much of the collection was unaccounted for. It took
approximately four years for the museum, at substantial cost, to compile a computerized in-
Attorney General of New York alleged that the trustees had not
properly catalogued the collection, and had failed to adequately su-
pervise the director of the museum.
Finally, a few filed complaints65 and a greater number of news-
paper accounts66 have questioned the prudence of acquisition and
deaccessioning policies in various museums. 67 These cases have gar-
nered much attention, but few, if any, have been decided on the mer-
its, in court. One can speculate as to why deaccessioning
controversies seldom result in court tests and, when they do, why
they are frequently settled or dropped. The reasons may include the
fact that trustees, who serve voluntarily, frequently would rather set-
tle than litigate such charges. Moreover, even if the allegations pos-
ventory of the entire collection as ordered by the court. The results revealed that 15,000 objects
remained unaccounted for but the parties disputed the significance of that number in light of
the millions of small items (such as arrow heads) in the collection. The Attorney General also
alleged that the previous board of trustees at the Indian folklore museum were negligent in
failing to provide an adequate system of climate control for the items in the collection, many of
which are composed of hide and wood. The original complaint further charged that some
trustees had purchased objects personally from the collection, which raised the suspicion of
self-dealing. On January 31, 1980 a stipulation and consent was filed which disposed of the
matter. See Ullberg, The Buck Stops Here: Trustees' Responsibilities in a New Age ofAccounta-
bility and Liability, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION 183 (1980) (American
Law Institute-American Bar Association continuing Legal Education Materials); Rosenbaum,
Will Robert Abrams Raise the Ethical Consciousness of Museums, 78 ARTNEWS 50 (Dec. 1979).
65. See, e.g., Rowan v. Pasadena Art Museum, No. C322817 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles
Co., Calif, filed May, 1980) (the Norton Simon Collection). In re Carnegie Institute, No. 208
(Pa. C.P. Alleg. Co. Orphan's Ct. Div. 1979) (stamps and coins). Cf. Lefkowitz v. Kan, No.
40082 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co., N.Y. 1978) (American Indian art).
66. See note 52 supra.
67. In a recent instance, that of the Norton Simon Museum (formerly the Pasadena Art
Museum) three former trustees/donors filed a complaint alleging that Norton Simon and other
trustees on the present governing board have subverted the uses and purposes for which the
trust property was accumulated. The controversy centers around the deaccessioning policies of
Norton Simon. The plaintiffs claim that Simon has deaccessioned and plans to continue deac-
cessioning much of the museum's collection of modern works with the intent to use the result-
ing museum space to store and exhibit to the public much of Simon's private collection, which
he has loaned or donated to the institution. It is alleged that many of those who donated art to
the Norton Simon Museum including artists and one of the former trustees who is a party to
this action, apparently did so with the idea that the collection as a whole would be a unique
assemblage of modern art for the benefit of the west coast public. The defendants, including
Norton Simon, view the current deaccessioning policy of the museum as a necessary pruning
of the collection and elimination of those works which are not of museum quality. Simon
states that he has not deaccessioned any object in a manner contrary to express donative intent,
and that his current domination of the museum's policies was a negotiated condition to his
rescuing the museum from financial difficulty.
Since the filing of the complaint, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction to prohibit the sale of further works from the collection without the present gov-
erning board first petitioning the court for prior approval to deaccession. In other words, the
court is closely monitoring the deaccessioning practices and is therefore making judgments on
the quality of pieces in the collection based on the hearing of expert testimony. For example,
after being restrained from selling in Christie's auction sales in the summer of 1980, the Simon
museum petitioned the court for leave to sell a group of modern prints at Sotheby's of New
York. The court granted an exemption based on a determination that the works to be offered
at auction were not of museum quality. See Failing, Is the Norton Simon Museum Misman-
ageg4 Or, Are the Former Trustees Misguided, 79 ARTNEWS 136 (Oct. 1980). As this article
went to press, the California Supreme Court filed its memorandum of intended decision, find-
ing for the defendant. Rowan v. Pasadena Art Museum, No. C322817 (Calif. Supreme Ct.,
filed Sept. 22, 1981).
sess merit, newspaper publicity often leads to the desired remedial
action.68 Of course, the allegations may simply have no merit.
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By and large, the issues raised in the above cases, including
physical plant maintenance, storage, acquisitions, deaccessioning,
cataloguing, deficit spending, failure to hire adequate personnel, and
failure to supervise personnel, have more in common with the re-
sponsibilities of a director of a business corporation than to those of
the common law trustee, whose main focus was investing the institu-
tion's endowment. It is submitted, therefore, that members of the
governing bodies of such institutions should be held to the same
standard of prudence applicable to directors of business corpora-
tions.
An additional reason supporting the adoption of the corporate
business judgment rule is that it is particularly appropriate in dealing
with budget deficits. On the one hand, governing boards of art insti-
tutions face the difficult task of soliciting contributions so that the
institution can meet its current financial obligations. On the other
hand, the conventional wisdom is that a budget showing black ink
may cause potential donors to conclude that the institution is not in
serious financial difficulty.
Unfortunately, case law provides only minimal guidance re-
garding the permissible bounds of deficit spending for non-profit or-
ganizations. The governing board of the Harding Museum is being
challenged for permitting deficit spending to deplete assets of the
museum. 70  In the Harris case, the board of a museum was sued,
68. Attorneys General frequently are seeking procedural reform for the future rather
than what might be a highly speculative and difficult-to-prove measure of damages. Attorneys
General also may be sensitive to the fears of trustees as revealed in the Touche-Ross Survey.
See notes 3 and 22 supra
69. There is no better evidence that the issue of deaccessioning often generates more heat
than light than a local law proposed in 1973 by an otherwise level-headed New York City
councilman which would have required most New York City museums to give both the Fi-
nance Committee of the New York City Council and the Parks Administration 30 days ad-
vance notice of the proposed disposition of any object (apparently including zoo animals) for
more than $5,000. New York City Council, proposed local law, Int. No. 1109, dated March 1,
1973. Mercifully, the proposal received a quiet burial. The danger implicit in the proposed
New York City Council Local Law was the potential interjection of local and perhaps paro-
chial political office holders into the artistic decisionmaking process of collections manage-
ment. This raises doubts for the integrity of the entire concept of collections management,
including the collecting of art forms not as yet appreciated by the public at large. The Attor-
neys General of New York and many other states properly have statutory authority to regulate
charities and represent the interests of the general public in the administration of charities
including deaccessioning. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 8-1.1 through 8-1.4
(McKinney 1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 732-204(c) (Purdon 1981-82). For a case demon-
strating the interest of political representatives in the internal affairs of charities, see Mailer of
Poppenhusen Association, Sup. Ct. Queens City, N.Y. (1980) (court No. 7407-80) (denied trust-
ees application to sell real estate owned by a charity; pointing out the presence of a local State
Assemblyman at court sessions, the court urged his good offices to restructure the Board of
Directors).
70. People ex rel Scott v. George Harding Museum, 58 I11. App. 3d 408, 374 N.E.2d 756
(1978).
unsuccessfully, for not energetically pursuing outside financial assist-
ance.7" ' In another noteworthy decision, Zehner v. Alexander,7" the
court enjoined the trustees from closing the college and removed two
members from office, although it was undisputed that the purpose of
the closing was to halt a drain on the school's endowment, caused by
continued deficits. By contrast, the court in Harris allowed trustees
broad discretion in their decision to sell real estate owned by a mu-
seum that was in financial trouble.73 In both Wilson College and
Harris, there was no suggestion of any bad faith on the part of the
trustees. In the former, however, the closing was prohibited; in the
latter a partial closing was permitted. The significant point is that
the decisions of the governing boards in each case required consider-
ation of complex financial information in order to be able to make
future budget projections. These are the kinds of issues with respect
to which the corporate standard seems particularly appropriate, be-
cause they are the kinds of decisions associated with running a busi-
ness.
The corporate, or business judgment rule also is appropriate in
the selection of personnel. The test should be whether the governing
body has established and executed rational personnel procedures, in
good faith, not whether the persons actually employed were in fact
honest or competent. Such procedures should of course include a
mechanism for supervision and periodic evaluation of performance.
This, however, is no different than the standard employed in any
well-run business enterprise.
The acquisition and deaccessioning of works of art present a
more difficult question in determining what standard of conduct to
apply to governing bodies. This is so because the members of the
governing body whose opinions are most valuable in this process are
those who also are art collectors. In this regard, a serious potential
for conflict of interest exists. A collector-trustee or director is likely
to be most knowledgeable in the area in which he or she collects; but
the collector-trustee or director is likely to be dealing with the same
dealers and auction houses with which the museum does business.
Yet absent evidence of a pattern of self-dealing, it is not in the public
interest to impose a strict trust standard on collector-trustees or di-
rectors. Who most needs whom? The institution's future depends
on the generosity of such persons. If the trust standard of absolute
liability is imposed with respect to conflicts of interest rather than a
71. Harris v. Attorney General, 31 Conn. Sup. 93, 324 A.2d 279 (1974).
72. No. 56-1979 (Pa. C.P. Franklin Co., Orphan's Ct. Div. 1979) (Decree fied May 25,
1979). Cf. Conway v. Emeny, 189 Conn. 612, 96 A.2d 221 (1953) in which the court held that
trustees' decision to close museum was not in accord with the terms of the trust instrument
creating the museum.
73. Harris v. Attorney General, 31 Conn. Sup. 93, 104, 324 A.2d 279, 285 (1974).
corporate standard of full disclosure such as is provided in the New
York Not-For-Profit Corporation Law74 disastrous consequences
could ensue: If a strict trust standard applies, why should a collector
ever consent to serve on a museum's governing board and expose
himself or herself to such potential liability, perhaps by innocently
doing business with a dealer with whom the museum does business?
No reason exists to put collectors in this dilemma. On the issue of
the conduct of trustees and directors of cultural institutions such as
museums, adoption of the Caesar's wife metaphor will harm, not
benefit the public at least until there is some evidence of significant
abuse. If the Touche-Ross survey7 5 is accurate, a strict trust stan-
dard might expose museums and the public to the loss of their most
important supporters.
Furthermore, aside from the conflict of interest question, it
would be grossly unfair to make a trustee liable for errors of judg-
ment on value and authenticity of works of art,76 which could result
under the trust standard if such errors were alleged to be the result of
negligence. It is easy to make such allegations on these aesthetic is-
sues because of the lack of objective standards. Under the business
judgment rule simple errors of judgment are not cause for
surcharge.77
Although the corporate standard is appropriate in most cases,
there are at least two categories where an exception may be made.
74. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715 (McKinney 1980-81); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 7728 (Purdon 1981-82).
75. See notes 3 and 22 supra.
76. For cases where acquisition or deaccessioning decisions were called into question see
notes 63-64 supra.
For cases revealing the subjective nature of expert opinions and appraisals of art objects,
see Dawson v. Malina, 463 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Findlay v. Duthuit (Sup. Ct., N.Y.
Co. 1980) N.Y. L.J. Oct. 10, 1980, at 5, col. 5; Furstenberg v. United States, 595 F.2d 603 (Ct.
Cl. 1979). The Dawson case provides an interesting example of a court trying to make sense
out of conflicting expert testimony on the provenance of art works. The Court's plight is re-
vealed in the following extract from the opinion:
Although there was testimony from du Boulay, Sistrunk and both Marilyn and Roger
Priem that this carving exhibited characteristics of works made during the Chien
Lung period, it is noteworthy that each of these experts qualified his or her opinion
with regard to this piece, du Boulay stating that he thought this piece to be late Chien
Lung or possibly shortly thereafter, Sistrunk stating that he himself would not guar-
antee that it had not been made at a later date, and Marilyn Priem stating that she
would ascribe the piece as being late eighteenth century/early nineteenth century or
late Chien Lung period/early Chia Ch'ing period. Indeed, Roger Priem flatly stated
that he thought this carving was not made during the Chien Lung period but rather
in the Chia Ch'ing period which followed. Plaintiff's expert Lally also testified that it
was his belief that this carving was not a Chien Lung piece but a late nineteenth
century work.
463 F. Supp. at 469. On the subject of appraisals of works of art see generally, Speiller, The
Favored Tax Treatment of Purchasers ofA/rt, 80 COL. L. REv. 214 (1980). The author describes
in detail the difficulties of appraising value and attributing provenance to works of art. Profes-
sor Speiller believes the problem so intractable that he concludes the only solution is to disal-
low totally charitable deductions for gifts of art of a claimed value less than $5,000. Id at 227-
29.
77. See note 41 supra.
First, the business judgment rule is clearly not applicable when the
statute expressly imposes a trust standard, as appears to be the case
in Pennsylvania with respect to the investment of funds."' A second
category in which a more rigid standard may be justified is where the
decision of a governing body would result in a deprivation of consti-
tutional and other basic rights.79 It seems fair and proper to impose
a stricter standard of conduct in such cases.
It has been suggested that a stricter standard is desirable be-
cause unlike a business corporation there are no stockholders to po-
lice the directors of a non-profit corporation. Robert Abrams, the
Attorney General of New York, in advocating a stricter standard,
has recently written that
Director accountability is the principal line of defense against mis-
management and abuse of the public trust. There are no share-
holders waiting in the wings, assisted by squads of lawyers ready
and anxious to commence a derivative action. The stock will not
plummet; the organization will not report a decline in earnings or
sales - there is no easy way to measure or control the quality of
performance. Simply put, without a clearly defined and meaning-
ful standard of conduct neither the directors nor the beneficiaries
of not-for-profit institutions are adequately protected.80
This expression confuses two separate and distinct questions: what
the standard of conduct of directors and trustees of non-profit insti-
tutions ought to be on the one hand, and who ought to have standing
to enforce those standards. The question of who should have stand-
ing to enforce trustee-director conduct remains regardless of whether
the trust or corporate standard is applied to govern such conduct.
The concept of who has standing to sue a non-profit institution or its
governing body is an expanding one. In addition to the Attorney
General, whose authority derives from his statutory role as represen-
tative of the general public,8 a broad range of interested parties
78. See text at note 36 supra.
79. See, e.q., Endress v. Bookdale Community College, 144 N.J. Super. 109, 364 A. 1080
(1976). That trial court held that all trustees participating in a decision to dismiss a faculty
advisor to the student newspaper for publishing an article critical of the chairman of the Board
of Directors of the college were liable for compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal, all
but one defendant were relieved of punitive damages. It is ironic that since the chairman of
the Board (the object of the critical article) had absented himself from the meeting at which the
decision to terminate the employee was made, he was one of the few directors, absolved of
liability! See also Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple University, 385 F. Supp. 473 (E.D.
Pa. 1974); Selzer v. Berkowitz, No. 77-1897 (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 1, 1980) (plaintiff's promotion and
tenure denied by faculty and board because of plaintiffs debriefing by CIA); 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976).
80. Abrams, Regulating Charity. The State's Role, in THE RECORD OF THE AsSOCIATION
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 481, 486 (1980). Although beyond the scope of this
article, one might also question Attorney General Abrams' sanguine opinion of the efficacy of
stockholder's derivative actions as a solution to the conduct of management of business corpo-
rations.
81. See, e.g., N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRusTs LAW, art. D (McKinney 1980-81), and in
particular § 8-1.4(0 and (m), which read in part:
(f) The attorney General shall represent the beneficiaries of.. . dispositions of prop-
have claimed standing to call trustees and directors of not-for-profit
institutions to account: These include beneficiaries of a union wel-
fare fund,82 patients of a hospital,83 students and alumni of a col-
lege,8a a minority director,85 former trustees, 6 and a neighboring
museum.87 Other interested members of the community also may, in
certain circumstances, have standing to sue.
88
V. Conclusion
The trustees and directors of modem non-profit cultural institu-
tions whether organized as trusts or corporations, are called upon to
make essentially the same kinds of decisions as are made by the di-
rectors of business corporations. These persons generally are unpaid
volunteers, who are appointed because of their perceived value to
the institution as managers or patrons, they are not elected because
of any proprietary interest in the entity.
The reported cases reveal little evidence of self-dealing, or neg-
ligence on the part of such trustees and directors and certainly no
evidence at all of a pattern of such self-dealing or negligence. Ac-
cordingly, it would not serve the public interest to impose a strict
trust standard on the trustees or directors of non-profit cultural insti-
tutions, especially because so many issues involve subjective judg-
ments regarding artistic and intellectual expression. Our financially
erty for religious, charitable, educational or benevolent purposes and it shall be his
duty to enforce the rights of such beneficiaries by appropriate proceedings in the
courts.
Id § 8-1.4(0.
(m) The Attorney General may institute appropriate proceedinqs to secure compli-
ance with this section and to secure the proper administration of any trust, corpora-
tion or other relationship to which this section applies.
Id § 8-1.4(m).
This enforcement right is not without its limits, especially where the trustees or directors
are themselves willing and able to take appropriate action to secure the proper administration
of the trust or corporation. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Lebensfeld, 5i N.Y.2d 442 (1980); Lefkowitz
v. Kan. (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.) N.Y.L.J. May 15, 1978 at 14, col. 4. See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
71, § 732-204(c) (Purdon 1981-82).
82. Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.C. 1971). See note 45 supra.
83. Stern v. Lucy-Webb Hayes National Training School for Deaconesses and Missiona-
ries, el al., 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.C. 1974). See note 21 supra.
84. Zehner v. Alexander, No. 56-1979 (Pa. C.P. Franklin Co., Orphan's Ct. Div. 1979)
(Decree filed May 25, 1979).
85. Matter of Horticultural Society of New York (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1980), N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 1, 1980, at 5. col. 1.
86. Rowan v. Pasadena Art Museum, No. C322817 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles Co., Calif.,
filed May 1980). See note 66 supra.
87. In re Carnegie Institute, No. 208 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. Co., Orphan's Ct. Div. 1979). The
Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania was permitted to intervene and file objections to a
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88. See, e.g., Matter of Samuel Jones, deceased, (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1981) N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 17, 1981, at 17, col. 1, in which the court found it unnecessary to decide whether former
recipients of charity from a foundation established for the relief of the poor and various com-
munity organizations had standing to sue the foundation, because the Attorney General, indis-
putably a proper party, had intervened.
pressed cultural institutions need patrons more than the patrons
need the institutions, no matter how difficult this reality may be to
accept. Furthermore, who in society in the last analysis is better
equipped to make management decisions for these institutions?
Should management be committed to the Attorneys General of the
various states, who themselves may be subject to outside political
and media pressures? Should judges, guided by such "experts" as
the contesting parties can assemble in court, be the arbiters? Should
non-profit institutions be under direct supervision of other interested
parties, such as patients, alumni, students, other beneficiaries of the
institution, local political representatives, or local groups who may in
reality be advocates of special interests? 9 All of the above may have
valuable contributions to make to the institutions, but there is no
evidence that they possess a greater degree of wisdom than those
volunteers who have devoted their time and frequently their wealth
to their respective institutions. Given the complexity of managing a
modern non-profit institution, and the sometimes carping nature of
the media, our courts, legislatures and law enforcement officials
ought to think long and hard before imposing rigid trust standards
on those hardy few who have the will and the means to shepherd
these institutions in times of financial uncertainty and reduced gov-
ernmental support.
89. Wexler, Trusting Trustees, New York Times, April 17, 1981, at A25, col. 2.

